Third Distinction

Division of the Text and Overview of the Questions

1. “After this we must see what baptism is” [Master Lombard Sent. ibid.] Above the Master dealt with a certain preamble to the baptism of Christ [d.2 n.44]. Here he deals with the baptism of Christ.

2. And it is divided into two parts: the preface and the treatise (which begins at “Baptism is called...”).

3. The treatise is divided into a principal part and an incidental part (the latter begins at ch.4).

4. The principal part is divided into three parts: first the Master deals with the parts that belong intrinsically to baptism, second with those who receive baptism (in distinction 4), third with the minister of it (in distinction 5).

5. The first part, which belongs to the present distinction 3, is divided into three: first he deals with the whatness of baptism or with what baptism is; second he deals with the form of it; third with the institution of it; and in this third part he inserts a treatment of the matter of baptism.

6. About this distinction 3 there are four questions that must be asked: first about the definition of baptism, namely whether its proper definition is what the Master posits: “Baptism is a dipping, that is, an exterior cleansing of the body, done under a prescribed form of words;” second about the form of baptism, whether this is the precise form of it: “I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen;” third about the matter of it, whether only pure natural water is the fitting matter of baptism; fourth its institution, whether the institution of baptism voids circumcision.

Question One. Whether the Proper Definition is what the Master Posits: ‘Baptism is a Dipping, that is, an Exterior Cleansing of the Body, done under a Prescribed Form of Words’

7. As to the first question there is argument to the negative.

A part is not predicted of the whole; cleansing is part of the sacrament of baptism, because from Augustine On John’s Gospel tr.80 n.3 (Gratian Decretum p.2 cause 1 q.1 ch.54), “A word is pronounced over the element, and the sacrament comes to be.” Therefore, as baptism is not a word, so neither is it a cleansing.

8. To the contrary:

The Master in the text [Sent. IV d.3 ch.1 n.2].

I. To the Question

A. How Baptism can have a Definition

9. In the solution of this question, one can speak similarly to the way spoken above in d.1 nn.181-187 about the definition of a sacrament.

For if one lays down from the usage of speakers the meaning of the word ‘baptism’, namely that baptism signifies a certain special sacrament so that, if baptism signifies cleansing (as the baptisms, that is the cleansings, of bodies and vessels was among the Jews), then a sacrament of baptism (understanding this in transitive sense) is that which signifies a special sacrament. This is plain both from specifying the signification and the effect signified (namely purifying the soul from original sin), and from specifying the foundation of this sort of signification and relation - it is plain, I say, from this supposition how baptism can have a definition. For since what is definable should be a positive being, per se one, real, and common (as maintained above, d.1 n.187), then baptism cannot be a pure non-being (as something impossible is).

10. The proof follows the way used above about a sacrament [d.1 n.181]:

For the idea of baptism is not in itself false, since there is no repugnance in any sensible thing or things being instituted by God for signifying, as an effect, the cleansing of the soul from sin.

11. Nor is baptism a pure non-being, as is a negation or privation - as is plain [d.1 n.182].

12. Baptism is also, second, something per se one as to what it principally per se signifies, which is the sort of relation a sign has to the sort of thing signified [d.1 n.183].

13. Nor is it an objection that baptism connotes its correlative and foundation, because thus also does any relation signify; nor is it an objection that many things are connoted in the foundation, because (as said above, d.1 n.199) a single relation of reason can be founded in any number of things distinct in reality. However, such connotation can very well prevent a thing’s having a definition in the primary sense; for nothing has a definition in the primary sense save substance, which is not defined by anything added on, either in the way the correlative is added in the definition of a correlative, or as a subject is added in the definition of an accident. Now many things have a definition but not in the primary sense, as is plain from Metaphysics 7.4.1030b4-7.

14. Only the third condition, then, namely that the definable thing must be a real being [d.1 n.184], prevents the sacrament of baptism having an altogether perfect definition; but it has a definition in the way that second intentions or any relations of reason are defined, because (as far as concerns an intellect possessed of science through definition) it is a definition in the way that a definition is that which a quiddity in reality corresponds to [d.1 nn.200-204].

B. Whether the Definition of Baptism is the One that the Master Posits

15. Second one needs to see in the first place whether the definition of baptism is the one the Master posits [n.6].

16. Here one must note that what baptism imports can be posited of the foundation of the relation in two ways:

In one way that the relation is founded in the whole thing (namely the cleansing together with the words) as in one foundation; and this, notwithstanding the unity of the foundation, is indeed possible, since the relation is one of reason.

17. In another way that the foundation of the relation is only the cleansing, so that nothing else is foundation, whether as total foundation or as part of the foundation - but not the cleansing by itself, that is not it without certain other things; rather it must have many other things accompanying it so as to be foundation, namely the words and that it is done by such and such a minister with such and such an intention. Nor is it unacceptable that real respects in the foundation should precede the relation of reason as presuppositions for that relation of reason. And so in the cleansing there precedes a relation to the accompanying words and to a receiving person in some way consenting. And one can posit that the relation of signification that baptism imports is founded in all the real relations of this sort that precede and thus determine the related foundation.

18. If the first of these ways [n.16] were set down, then since in the case of an accident taken in the concrete the whole of its subject and not precisely a part of it is placed in the accident’s definition (just as neither is an accident in the concrete predicated of a part of its subject but of the whole of it), then cleansing would not be the baptism (or the sacrament of baptism) but the cleansing and the words together would be. Because the cleansing alone is not the subject or the foundation of this relation, but both cleansing and words together are. Therefore neither one nor the other would be per se denominated by it.

19. But if the second way [n.17] be set down, then just as the definition of baptism would be predicated denominatively of the cleansing (although the cleansing is understood to be circumstanced by many real relations in order for the relation to belong to it), so too conversely could in the definition of this relation (taken in the concrete) be put the cleansing alone directly and all the others indirectly, along with certain determinations signifying that they determine or circumstance the cleansing.

20. Of these two ways the first [n.16] seems to be truer, because the words would not seem to be simply necessary unless they were the sign or part of the sign.

If however it were said that the words were certain determinations of the cleansing, which is the sign, since positing the cleansing as the sign rather than both [sc. words and cleansing] is sufficient when a sufficient idea of signifying can be found in that one, and since the exterior cleansing can adequately be posited to signify the interior cleansing - if one holds this view, the following could be set down as the idea of baptism, that “baptism is the cleansing of a man somehow consenting, done with water by another, who at the same time pronounces certain words with the due intention, this cleansing signifying efficaciously, by divine institution, the cleansing of the soul from sin.”

21. But if the other way is maintained [n.17], namely that the words are part of the foundation, then another idea of baptism could be set down, namely the following: “baptism is a sacrament of cleansing the soul from sin, which consists in the cleansing of a man somehow consenting, done with water by someone else who cleanses, and in certain words that are pronounced by the same cleanser along with due intention.”

22. But as to how the particulars placed in each idea or definition are necessary for the idea of baptism, this will become very clear about each of them in what follows [d.3 qq.2-3].

23. Nor is the difference between these ideas such that the same elements in each are not necessary for baptism; but one of them puts cleansing alone directly in its definition while the other posits that the cleansing and the words belong to the idea equally - and this difference arises from a diverse way of thinking about the foundation of this relation, whether it is the circumstanced cleansing alone or is the cleansing and the words together.

C. Solution of the Question

24. The solution of the question, then, is plain, because the Master seems to be speaking according to the opinion that circumstanced cleansing is baptism; and, taking this position, he touches on what principally belongs to the idea of baptism, although many concomitant things need to be implicitly understood, which are expressed in the idea of “the cleansing of man somehow consenting etc.” [n.20].

II. To the Initial Arguments

25. As to the argument [n.7], the reply is made that the matter is rightly predicated of an artificial thing, since the matter is the whole substance of an artifact; hence a box is not only called ‘wooden’ but also ‘wood’. Now a sacrament, inasmuch as it is a thing of reason, is likened to an artifact.

26. But this reply is nothing, because a part of matter is not predicated of an artifact (for a house is not stones, but other things along with stones are necessary for the being of a house). For, as was said before [n.18], nothing is posited in the concrete in the definition of a concrete thing save that of which the accident is predicated or can be predicated in the concrete; but no accident is predicated of a part of its subject.

27. One should say,     therefore , when upholding the Master’s definition [n.6], that cleansing would not be a part of the foundation that baptism includes, but is the whole foundation, though a remote one, and between this and the relation of sign there are certain mediating relations of reason, as was said [n.24; d.1 n.198].

28. And if it be objected that cleansing cannot be described in either way [nn.25, 27] because it formally imports a relation of reason, and a relation of reason is not any real thing or things; therefore etc     . - my reply is that just as a relation of reason in the concrete is said of an external thing (in the way that this statement is true ‘this word ‘man’ is a name or sign of human nature’), so conversely in the definition of this sort of concrete thing one can put ‘external thing’ as something added, as the foundation of the relation; therefore the objection is not valid.

Question Two. Whether this is the Precise Form of Baptism: ‘I Baptize you in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit’

29. Proceeding to the second principal question [n.6], it is argued that the form of baptism is not this: ‘I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.’

30. First because in the case of everything that has form and matter, its form is in the matter; but this form is not in the water itself nor in the cleansing as in a subject (as is plain).

31. Second, Christ in Matthew 28.39 did not express this form when expressing the form of baptism; but the form of the sacraments he instituted is taken from him;     therefore etc     .

32. Third, if the above words are the form, then either as they are true or as they are false. But not as they are false, because there is nothing false in sacraments of truth. Nor as they are true, because their truth, in the order of nature, follows the conferring of the sacrament of baptism (for the truth of a statement follows the being of that which is signified by it, and the statement here signifies the conferring of the sacrament). But a form, in the way it is a form, is not posterior but prior to that of which it is the form, Metaphysics 7.3.1029a5-7.

33. Again, species and form are the same; but there are more species of baptism than the aforesaid form, because there are three: namely baptism of water, of fire, and of blood (Gratian Decretum p.3 d.4 ch.5.34), and the aforesaid form is not followed in the two last;     therefore etc     .

34. Again, there is argument about the parts of this form:

First as follows: the Greeks truly baptize, because Latins who come to them are not rebaptized, or because those baptized by them are not rebaptized when they come to us. Yet the Greeks do not keep the above form but this one: “May the servant of Christ be baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.”

35. Again, according to Priscian [Grammatical Instruction 8.18.101] the verb in the first person [in Latin] implicitly contains the first person pronoun without the addition of ‘I’. And this is confirmed by Gregory IX Decretals III tit.42 ch.1 [from Pope Alexander III] ‘On baptism and its effect’, where the gloss says that “the personal pronoun does not belong to the substance of the form, because the verb ‘baptizo’ (‘[I] baptize’) without the first person pronoun ‘ego’ completes the full sense.” Also Decretals p.3 d.4 ch.24, “If anyone says ‘[I] baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,’ the person is baptized from the fact that the one baptizing has the intention to baptize.” But the first person pronoun is not made express there.This issue does not arise in English or some other languages, because the pronoun ‘I’ must be expressed in addition to the verb to complete the sense. ¹⁰

36. Again, Gratian, Decretum p.3 d.4 ch.24, from Ambrose On the Holy Spirit 1.3.40-43, “If they have been baptized in the name of the Trinity and of Christ they should not be rebaptized,” because thus did the Apostles baptize, as said in Acts 2.38, 8.12, 19.5.

37. Again Augustine On the Trinity 5.7.8, “It is the same thing to be Father and to be begetter;”     therefore to say ‘in the name of the Begetter and the Begotten’ would have equally the same force as to say ‘in the name of the Father and of the Son etc     .’

38. Again Ambrose ibid. 1.3.42 (and it is also in Lombard’s text), “If the mystery of the Trinity is held by faith and only one of the Persons is named, the sacrament is complete.”

39. Again [Aristotle] On Interpretation 10.20b1-2, “Nouns and verbs mean the same when transposed;”     therefore the words would have equal force if they were transposed; therefore the form given above is not a precise one.

40. On the contrary:

Gregory IX Decretals III tit. 42 ch.1, “If anyone has immersed a child three times in water ‘in the name of the Father etc     .’ and has not said, ‘I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit’, the child is not baptized.The Vatican editors note that all these arguments, nn.30-40, were already set down by Richard of Middleton in his Sent. IV d.3 princ.2 q3. The same holds of several of the opening arguments in the following questions. ¹¹

I. To the Question

A. Whether and How Certain Words could be the Form of Baptism

41. Here three [four]The Vatican editors note that Scotus wrote ‘four’, but they correct it to ‘three’ because Scotus seems only to deal with three in what follows. However, it may be that Scotus is adverting to the fact that the third (about the words of the sacrament) has two sub-parts, about the non-principal words and about the principal words, which makes four in all. ¹² things need to be considered. The first is whether certain words could be the form of this sacrament.

Here one must note that, when speaking properly of form as it is one of the two parts of a composite thing, the form of a sacrament is the relation of sign, by which relation it is formally such a sacrament; and the matter is the whole that is the foundation of the relation However, if there are in some foundation many things that one sacrament in some way comes to be from, and if these many things are not disposed altogether equally but one of them is as it were prior and a determinable while the other is as it were posterior and a determination of the preceding one, then the first can be called ‘matter’ by a certain likeness to matter, and the second can be called form. For it belongs to matter to precede in origin and to be determined, while it belongs to form to follow and to determine.

42. Likewise, what is more principal and more actual can be called form with respect to what is less principal and more potential.

43. Likewise, what is more spiritual can be called form with respect to what is less spiritual.

44. As to the question at issue, then, cleansing and words come together as foundation of the relation of baptism, either as parts of the foundation, according to one opinion [n.16], or as foundation and circumstances of the foundation, according to the other opinion [n.17].

45. If in the first way, the more principal part in signifying is the words themselves, because according to Augustine On Christian Doctrine 2.3.4, “Words among men have obtained the principality in signifying;” and he says something similar in On the Trinity 15.11.20. So, because of this principality in signifying, words could be called ‘form’ with respect to the other part.

46. But if in the second way [n.44], it is plain that words are the determining elements with respect to cleansing.

47. And whether this way or that, it is plain that words are more spiritual than cleansing.

And so, according to this metaphorical use of the terms, it is plain that where a visible sign and certain words come together at the same time in the foundation of some relation of a sacrament, the words always state the form.

B. About the Form of Baptism Needed on the Part of the Minister

48. The second thing that needs to be considered is what words are the form of baptism in the above stated way [n.29].

49. Here one needs to know that there is in sacraments something necessary simply, that is, on the part of the sacrament (something namely which when it does not exist there is altogether no sacrament), and also something necessary in a certain way, that is, on the part of the minister (without which the minister, when dispensing the sacrament, cannot avoid sin).

50. But if one asks about the necessary form in this second way [n.49], that is, about the form that must necessarily be observed by the minister, I say that in the whole Roman Church the form that the question is about [n.29] is necessary, namely necessary for the minister whose office it is to baptize. Who this minister is will be stated later (in d.5 nn.30, 70-73), for ignorance cannot excuse him since he is bound to know the matters of the office he is deputed to. The proof of the conclusion is that any minister in the Roman Church is bound necessarily to keep the form that the same Church has imposed on its ministers. Of this sort is the form that the question is about, as is plain from Gregory IX Decretals III t.42 ch1, ‘about baptism and its effect’.

51. But if one asks about the necessary form that a minister among the Greeks must observe, one can say that, as far as concerns certain non-principal words in the form, namely those that express the receiver and the act or the minister, the Greek Church has sometimes not wanted to keep that form [n.34], the reason for which is touched on by the Apostle I Corinthians 1.11-3, 3.3-6, “But this I say, that each of you says, ‘I am of Paul etc.’;” because they were glorying in the ministers who baptized them, as if baptism were attributed or ascribed to those ministers; and Paul rebukes them, and indicates their dispute when he says, “Is Christ divided?”

52. For this reason it was ordained among the Greeks (in order to take away the schism) that the minister would not be expressed, nor the act in the indicative mood but in the optative mood, because then the minister is signified not to be the author of baptism, but only the minister desiring and praying for the effect of baptism to be conferred by God; the receiver too would not be expressed in the second person but in the third person, as if he were precisely not receiving what he receives from someone directly speaking to him. However, it would have been possible for the receiver to have been expressed better than by the phrase ‘servant of Christ’, namely by his own name; for baptism is not of someone who is already a servant of Christ but so that he may be a servant of Christ - speaking of the spiritual servitude by which a Christian is a servant of Christ.

53. About this Greek form [n.34] one can say that, as long as it was tolerated by the Roman Church, it was permitted to the Greeks, and also permitted for the time which it was instituted for during the aforesaid cause [n.51]. But when the cause ceased, the common form [n.29] could reasonably have been imposed on them.

54. Either, then, the Roman Church has prohibited that form as far as the Greeks are concerned, and then they sin by keeping it (because it is not found in any chapter [of canon law] making special mention of them); or if the Roman Church has permitted or conceded it, then it seems licit for them to continue the form. And if, while such permission or license continues to stand, they have ordained in their particular Councils that such form is first to be kept among them, it seems that their ministers are bound to keep it. The case is just as when permission by the Roman Church continues to stand that in some places a triple immersion [in baptism] should be done and in others a single immersion; for then in a Church that has determined on a triple immersion a triple immersion should be done, and it is a necessity in the minister to keep the precept and the manner of his own Church.

So much about the necessary form on the part of the minister.

C. About the Form Necessary on the Part of the Sacrament

55. Third, as to the form necessary on the part of the sacrament [n.49], it is plain that this form is not necessary as to all the words, because of the fact that the Greeks did truly baptize, though not under the same form [nn.29, 34].

56. Hence one must note that in this form there are some words that belong to it principally and some that belong to it non-principally, because they express the minister, the act, and the receiver.

1. About the Non-Principal Words of the Form

57. One of these, namely the minister, is not required to be expressed by any word, not even by the pronoun for any person, because it is not in the words of Christ in the last chapter of Matthew (28.19).

58. But the other two, namely the act and the receiver, must be expressed, though not determinately in the way they are expressed in the words stated [n.29], namely the act in the indicative mood and the receiver by a second person pronoun. But the act can be expressed by a verb in another mood, and the receiver by a word or pronoun in another person, as the Greeks do [n.34]. But the reason for the necessity that these two be expressed in some way or other is taken from the phrase in the last chapter of Matthew, “baptizing them in the name of the Father etc.,” where the act and the receiver are expressed.

2. About the Principal Words of the Form

59. Now about the principal words, which are ‘in the name of the Father and of the Son etc.’, one must consider whether these precisely belong to the form.

60. To understand this one must note that, according to the Philosopher Physics 5.1.225a1-b3, 2.226a23-25, change is of four kinds, namely in substance, quality, quantity, and ‘where’.

61. Thus, there can be a fourfold variation in these words, namely in substance, when other words are put for these, or a different word for this or that word; in quantity, by adding or taking away - and if by adding, whether by diminishment or by putting something afterwards or in between; in quality, namely by taking away some termination required for appropriate speech; in ‘where’ by transposition.

62. About each of these variations I say that if he who varies in respect of them intends to use the words that he does use as the Church’s or baptism’s precise form, he does not baptize. For he lacks the intention to use the words that are used as the form by the Church; for he intends to use as the precise form of baptism words that are in some way altered.

63. Supposing that the intention is not lacking, then, we ask, on the part of the words in themselves, which of these variations can stand alongside the form and which cannot. The individual points will be dealt with in order.

a. About Variation in Substance

64. About the first [substance, n.61] I say that it can be understood in two ways: either [A] that a word different in a certain respect replaces one of the principal words (namely a different locution), though it signifies the same thing under the same idea; or [B] that a word different simply does the replacing, namely a different locution signifying a different thing.

65. And if the replacement happens in the second way [B], this can still be in two ways: either [B1] because the thing signified in that very place is altogether disparate from what is signified by the word that is replaced (as would be the case if ‘stone’ were to replace ‘Father’), or [B2] because what is signified is fitting and has altogether the same substrate in reality.

66. This latter way [B2] too happens in two ways:

Either [B2.1] because it distinctly expresses the Three Persons signified under ideas different from those signified by ‘of the Father and of the Son’ etc. (and such is the case with the nouns ‘of the Begetter, of the Begotten, and of the Inspirited’; for these signify the Persons under the idea of their properties, not under the idea of their subsistence and hypostasis).

Or [B2.2] these Persons are signified implicitly, and this either [B2.2a] as in some collective whole (in the way that the name ‘Holy Trinity’ signifies), or [B2.2b] implicitly in something that imports the Persons by some correspondence of effect to cause, as does the name ‘Christ’; for this name signifies the Son in his human nature, the anointed one, and it gives to be understood the ‘Father’ by whom he is anointed and the ‘Holy Spirit’ with whom he is anointed.

67. So therefore, as to this division of variation [sc. in substance], we have [1=A] a name different only in locution, or [2=B1] a name signifying something altogether disparate, or [3=B2.1] names that do not signify the Three Persons under the idea of Persons, as ‘Begetter’ and ‘Begotten’, or [4=B2.2a] a name that signifies them collectively, as ‘Trinity’, or [5=B2.2b] a name that connotes the Persons as effects connote their cause.I have added the numerical notation in these paragraphs [nn.64-67] for ease of comprehension and reference. ¹³

68. About these five possibilities [n.67]:

About the first [1] it is plain that the same form remains, because baptism can be done in any language. Perhaps, however, it is not licit (for someone baptizing solemnly by virtue of his office) to use words of just any language (as it is not licit in the consecrating of the Eucharist). For the Roman Church has ordained that ecclesiastical offices be said and sacraments be administered in grammatical Latin. And this is reasonable, because grammatical Latin can be more distinctly written and spoken. As for words altogether inappropriate [2], it is plain that the form is not preserved in them.

69. As for names signifying properties of the Persons and not the Persons [3], as ‘Begetter’ etc., I say that the form is not preserved in them, because Christ wanted the Persons to be named with the names of the Persons, and he did so reasonably, in accord with what was touched on in Ord. I d.22 n.10. For just as a name was given to the Jews signifying the divine essence under its proper idea, which they call the ‘Tetragrammaton’ name of God, so Christ gave to the Church names signifying the Persons under their proper ideas. Or if he did not so give them, yet it is very possible that, in some invocation, the name of the Person has some efficacy that the name of the property of the Person does not have. For when seeking some gift from someone ‘for love of John’, the gift would be more quickly obtained than if, in place of the proper name, something signifying a property of the individual were put.

70. As for the name of the Trinity [4], it is plain that Christ understood that the Persons needed to be made explicit; but in the name ‘Trinity’ the Persons are only introduced implicitly. And therefore, as to what is said in the chapter from Gratian [n.36], ‘Trinity’ must be understood to be put for the three Persons explicitly.

71. As for the fifth [5], namely about the name ‘Christ’, it is plain that it was sometimes licit to baptize in that name, Acts 2.38, 9.17-18, 10.48.

72. But whether it would be baptism now if it were thus handed on is doubtful.

73. It seems that someone thus baptizing would sin mortally; indeed he would altogether not baptize.

The proof of the first part is that no inferior can revoke the law of a superior, neither simply nor for a time. The law about baptizing in the common form of ‘In the name of the Father     etc .’ was promulgated by Christ, Matthew 28.19. So for the time Christ has not revoked the same, no one else can revoke it. But although Christ made dispensation from that law in the time of the primitive Church (because then there was a reason for dispensation, so that the name of Christ might be made public), yet he made no dispensation when that reason ceased. Therefore     , no inferior can for any time thereafter be absolved in any way from that law.

The proof of the second part is similar, because the form commonly handed on always remains as the form unless another form has, by way of dispensation, been handed on for a certain time by the institutor of the form. But the form handed on by way of dispensation was only handed on for the time for which there was a reason for the dispensation, namely in the primitive Church, so that the name of Christ might be made public. Therefore when the time of dispensation ceased, only that form remains which, from the institution, was the form.

74. What then? For I do not dare to say that someone baptized today in the name of Christ would have been baptized; but neither do I dare to say or assert that he would not have been baptized, for I do not read where the dispensation was relaxed or revoked.

75. In this matter, then, I reckon there is a doubt whether such a one has been baptized. And in his case one should use the sort of remedy that is used in other doubtful cases, on which Gregory IX Decretals III tit.42 ch.2 says, “As to those about whom there is a doubt whether they have been baptized, let them be baptized in these words, ‘If you have been baptized, I do not baptize you; but if you have not been baptized I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit’.”

76. And universally in all doubtful cases as to matter and form there are three maxims. The first is, ‘If it is possible, the safest way is to be chosen’; the second is, ‘If it is not possible, the way next to the safest is to be held to’; the third is, ‘When the impossibility ceases, one must cautiously supply what the earlier impossibility was preventing’.

b. About Variation in Quantity

77. About the second main variation, namely in quantity [n.61], I say that if anything is added that is repugnant to the principal words of the form, or that diminishes them, nothing is done, because the form is not preserved. An example of the first is if it be said ‘In the name of the Father the Greater and of the Son the Lesser etc.’; an example of the second is if there is an omission or a disjunction or if some condition that does not exist is interposed, as ‘If I am a bishop I baptize you in the name of the Father etc.’; or if there is some disjunctive speech against the idea of the form, because a disjunctive determinately posits one of the disjuncts; and the same in like cases.

78. About interposition, however, supposing it is not with respect to anything that is disruptive or repugnant, there is this special point that, if the interposition interrupts the due unity of the form, the form does not remain. But as to when such necessary unity is interrupted, let it be judged by other human acts. That is, when no judgment from an interruption by something impertinent is made in common discourse that the previous speaking cannot be continued, then likewise no such judgment should be made in the issue at hand. For example, if someone were to begin speaking and say ‘be quiet’ or ‘go away’, it would not for this reason be reckoned necessary for him to begin his speech again, but he could continue the same speech notwithstanding such interruption.

79. Now as to subtraction, if one of the non-principal words is taken away, the answer was stated before [nn.56-58]. But if one of the principal words is taken away, nothing is done, because each of those words is per se necessary for the form. But if some syllable is taken away by syncope,Syncope is when a syllable is removed from within a word, as ‘camra’ for ‘camera’. ¹⁴ then the form is not for this reason destroyed. For God did not wish to bind man to words in the sacraments beyond the point where the words suffice for expressing the concept. But words with syncope suffice, as is plain, because the hearer can well understand with syncope the concept of the speaker. But syncope is to be more guarded against in sacramental words than in common words, because of the reverence of the sacrament. However, I would not dare to say that he who does not avoid syncope sins mortally (provided his failure to avoid it is not from contempt, but is from some infirmity or some human inadvertence that he might not avoid as much as possible in all cases).

c. About Variation in Quantity

80. About the third main variation, namely in quality [n.61]: As to the determination that belongs to the chief part of the words, the answer is plain from Gratian Decretum p.3 d.5 ch.86, where the Pope, mentioning a priest who baptized “in the name of the Fathera, the Sona, and the Holy Spirita,” replies that “if he did this from lack of skill in the language without intending to introduce error, he has truly baptized.” The point must be taken about an inappropriateness at the end of a word that does not prevent the concept signified by the words from being able to be understood. And how this is possible is well known by experience to those who listen to certain illiterates speaking improperly and yet they well grasp what they want to say, even as to individual words.

d. About Variation in ‘Where’

81. About the fourth main variation, namely in ‘where’ [n.61], I say that some transpositions do altogether vary the sense, as suppose it were said “I of the Father baptize you in the name of the Son, etc.” But some transpositions may retain in the form the same force, as suppose it were said “In the name of the Son and of the Father etc.” The first transposition is an impediment, because it removes the meaning from the statement as it has been instituted. The second is not an impediment, because although it would be fitting, when mentioning the Persons, to preserve the order (which is of the Persons according to origin), and although this is necessary as far as the minister is concerned, yet it does not seem altogether necessary on the part of the sacrament. For the Persons, in whatever order they are named, are a single efficient principle in baptism, and they are invoked as such.

II. To the Initial Arguments

82. To the first argument [n.30] the answer is plain from the first article [nn.41-47] about what the form properly is here, and how the words are the form.

83. To the second argument [n.31] the answer is plain from the second article [nn.48-54] that Christ expressed the words that are the principal ones in the form (namely the act and the receiver). But it was in the power of the Church to determine what words of the first or third person in the indicative or optative mood would express the receiver and the act. And the Latin Church has chosen to express the receiver in the second person and the act in the indicative mood - and reasonably, in order to indicate that the minister is truly conferring the sacrament. But the Greek Church has chosen to express the receiver in the third person and the act in the optative mood - and reasonably for the time, as was said [nn.51-53], namely so as to take away the schism between those who were glorying in the ministers who baptized them.

84. To the third [n.32] one can say that the division [sc. into false and true] is not sufficient, for it is very possible that some words taken materially are the form in some sacrament; indeed, God could have instituted non-significative word-signs for the form.

85. In another way it can be said that the speech is true, not for the time of speaking it, but for the final instant that completes the speaking, as will be said below in the material about the Eucharist [d.8 q.2 n.16]. And then, when the argument is made that a statement, as true, follows the actuality of the thing, this is true: it follows the cleansing itself, and the cleansing is introduced there by the word ‘I baptize’; and then the sense will not be, ‘I baptize, that is, I confer the sacrament of baptism’, but it will be ‘I baptize, that is, I cleanse’.

86. To the fourth [n.34]Scotus does not respond to the third argument, n.33 (similar omissions happen elsewhere in the Ordinatio, e.g. I d.3 nn.337-338, 402, d.7 n.2, d.11 n.6, d.12 nn.4-5). ¹⁵, about the Greeks, the answer is plain from what was said above [nn.51-54].

87. To the fifth [n.35], about the pronoun ‘ego’, it is true that it does not belong simply to the form, neither as expressed nor as implied in a verb of the first person. But as to the Latin Church (at least after the time of Alexander III) it is necessary for the minister to express the pronoun ‘ego’; and the gloss with its proof can be understood of the time preceding the constitution of Alexander III.

88. To the one about the Trinity and Christ [nn.36, 38] the answer is plain from what was said about the first variation in words [nn.66-75].

89. To the one about ‘Begetter’ etc. [n.37] one must say that Augustine means there that ‘Begetter’ and ‘Father’ are the same as to their being said in relation to another, or as to importing the property of the same Person. But they are not the same as to the first signified concept in each case, because ‘Father’ signifies first and per se the supposit in the divine nature, while ‘Begetter’ signifies first and per se the property; and there is not the same force in a proper name and in the name of a property when one of the Persons is invoked for some effect.

90. To the last one [n.39] I say that the proposition of the Philosopher is true absolutely of transposed names, but it does not follow that the conception of the whole locution is the same when such names are transposed in this or that way. But the form [of baptism] does not consist only in the signification of single words but in the signification of the whole locution.

Question Three. Whether Pure Natural Water is the Only Fitting Matter of Baptism

91. To the third principal question [n.6] there is argument that pure natural water is not the only fitting matter of baptism:

Because artificial waterFor the meaning of artificial water see nn.107-110 below. ¹⁶ has the same accidents as natural water, namely humidity, coldness, clearness, and the like; but a substance is known from its accidents, On the Soul 1.1.402b21-22.The Vatican editors note that several of these initial arguments are found in Richard of Middleton, and another in Thomas Aquinas. ¹⁷

92. Again, what is mixed is grosser than elemental water; but artificial water is finer, or at least not grosser;     therefore artificial water is not something mixed; therefore it is an element, and no element but water; therefore etc     .

93. Again, mixable things can be separated from the mixture, On Generation and Corruption 1.10.327b27-28; therefore someone can apply an active power to the passivity of the mixture to bring about such separation; therefore artificial water, when separated from the mixture, can be elemental water. There is a confirmation from Exodus 7.11-12, 8.7, about frogs, where the art of demons applied an active to a passive power to produce frogs at once from the water of the river; therefore, conversely, it was just as possible to apply by art the active power to the passive power to separate the element from the mixture, especially since reducing things to their elements is easier than generation or composition.

94. Again, as to the adjective ‘pure’, natural water is finer than water in use, from Meteorology 2.3.358a21-b27. And it is plain from experience that earth is separated from water in use by boiling or purifying, and lies at the bottom.

95. Again, from Christ’s side water flowed, wherein baptism is instituted, according to Gregory IX Decretals III tit.41 ch.8. But what flowed from Christ’s side was not elemental water but bodily fluids, because in a dead body there is not any fluid immediately that is elemental water, nor did any fluid come out through the wound save what was in the body at the time of the opening of the wound; but it was then not pure water;     therefore etc     .

96. On the contrary:

John 3.5 “Unless one be born again of water and the Holy Spirit     etc .”

97. Again, through reason: “Let alchemical artisans know that species cannot be mutated by art,” Meteorology 4.12.390b9-14. Therefore     , something mixed cannot be reduced to pure water.

I. To the Question

98. Here the reply must be stated proportionally to what was said at the beginning of the preceding question [nn.41-47]:

For matter (taking matter properly as that which the form of a thing is in) is the whole of what can there be sensed and on which the relation of the sign, which is the formal part of baptism, is founded. But just as in this whole sensed matter there is something that is more principal and ultimate determinant, and is called the ‘form’, so there is something less principal or is determinable, and is called the matter.

99. But such matter can be understood as proximate to that which is to be signified or as remote from it:

The proximate matter is the cleansing itself, for it, along with the words as proximate sign, signifies the effect of baptism.

100. And therefore we should not feel pressured by the doubt in Gratian Decretum with glosses, p.2 cause 1 q.1, ‘lest perhaps an ass drink the sacrament’ [Gandulphus, as quoted in Gratian, said that the water is the sacrament, so that if an ass drink the water it drinks the sacrament], which is truly an asinine doubt. For the cleansing only occurs in its becoming, and however much the water could be drunk or poured out here or there, the cleansing itself cannot be [cf. d.6 n.67].

101. And ‘cleansing’ is understood here not only in the way that water is said to wash the body as it were formally, but also as a man is said to wash the body with water as if the water were properly in an active state - for the mere contact of the body with water, which is as it were the formal cleansing, is not what was instituted in the sacrament as the sign or part of the sign, but the washing that is done by someone who does the cleansing.

102. Nor is it necessary that the cleansing here be the cleansing that is contrasted with washing and includes the removal of dirt from the body by contact with water. Rather the commonly meant sense of washing is enough, the washing of the body with water by someone else as agent; and this is nothing other than that water is brought into contact with the body by someone who brings that contact about.

103. And by understanding the cleansing or washing in this way, the washing is the proximate matter, as the per se foundation or part of the foundation of the signification of it.

104. But the water that is applied to the body in this cleansing is the remote matter.

105. And the proof is no other than that so it was instituted, as is plain in John 3.5 and Matthew 3.11.

106. But there is appropriate fittingness as to why it was so instituted, for water is cold, flowing, lucid, necessary, and common. And all these properties agree with the fluid that baptism ought to be done in, since baptism is for repressing the heat of concupiscence, to loosen the stiffness of disobedience, to lighten up the clarity of faith, to lead into the way of salvation; and all these properties are common, just as the law (of which the sacrament is the beginning) is common for salvation to all.The Vatican editors note that all these properties are found already in William of Militon and Richard of Middleton. ¹⁸

107. But why is ‘natural’ put in the question to distinguish water from artificial water? I reply that the waters that are commonly called artificial are certain mixed bodies and are not called water save equivocally.

108. The point is plain, first, because so it is as to the qualities that follow the whole species. For a single likeness in quality does not involve identity of substance, but a single unlikeness in the whole species proves that the substance is not alike. But the waters that are called ‘artificial waters’ have in their whole species some quality that is unlike elemental water.

109. The point is plain, second, from the way these waters are generated. For it is impossible for the whole of created nature to generate something else from something save by following a determinate process through determinate means. For the whole of created nature could not at once, and without intervening means, generate wine from vinegar, but there must be a return to the prime matter that is common to both, which is water and which, when at length drawn up in the grape through the trunk of the vine, is eventually converted into wine. And this opinion is posited by the Philosopher in Metaphysics 8.5.1045a3-6, and it is plain to the senses that it is so.

110. But these artificial waters, whatever they are made from, are not made by keeping to nature’s process through determinate or ordered means. They are also universally made by the action of fire decocting and dissolving them. But fire does not seem to be sufficient in its active force to convert any mixed thing into elemental water. For this reason, it can be universally admitted that the waters called ‘artificial’ are not fitting matter for baptism, because they are not in the species of elemental water.

111. As to the addition of ‘pure’ in the question [n.6], one must understand that impurity in water can be taken in two ways: either because of mixing or juxtaposition (as washing water is called ‘impure’), or because of a mixture deviating from the species (as mixed fluids are not said to be pure water).

12. The first impurity, indeed, is not an impediment, provided however it does not remove from the water its being suitable for washing; nor is there any reason for the exclusion save that it was instituted so. Hence water mixed with flour in paste or sponge, or water mixed with thick dye (and so on with others), even though these waters may touch the body, yet they are not fitting material for baptism. For such contact is not washing but only contact of flowing water that freely spreads itself over the skin or makes a separation between the skin and some other body.

113. In the second way [n.109] I say that there can be some impurity while yet the water remains within the species of water - as perhaps if water begins to thicken in tending to generate a grosser element; and this is not an impediment provided however it is still fluid. And I say so to this extent, that in ice or snow, which however are imperfect water or on the way to being a mixture, baptism cannot be done while they are ice and snow, because there is no washing there, as there is not either in anything hard. But if water is altered to be now outside the species of water, it is altogether not the matter of baptism. And it is sufficiently clear about some alterations that they make the altered result to be outside the species of water, as about fluids that are naturally reduced first through digestion (as saliva, urine, and the like), according to Decretals III tit.42 ch.5.

114. About other alterations, however, this is not manifest, as about the cookings and mixings we perceive, where it is not clearlyly apparent that the species is altered (as about the juice from boiled flesh, and water in flour, and the like, and about white mustard and beer and mead); for it is not manifest that there is any active force there that is corrupting the species of water

115. However, this discussion does not belong to a theologian, who is determining the matter of baptism, save insofar as it can be got from the canon of the Bible. Nor does it belong to the canonist, who is determining the conditions of the matter as they are determined by the ordering of the Church. Rather it belongs to the natural philosopher, whose job it is to investigate which alteration removes water from its species and which does not.

116. And if there is a doubt about any instances, and they have been used to confer baptism, one must use the three maxims set down in the solution of the preceding question [n.76] to apply remedies for those whose baptism is likely in doubt.

II. To the Initial Arguments

117. To the first argument [n.91] I say that although artificial water has similar accidents, yet it has a dissimilarity or dissimilarities from the whole species, and from this follows a distinction of substance.

118. To the second [n.92] I say that although some artificial water is finer than elemental water, because it is more penetrating, yet its fineness is not that of simplicity but of active power (and in this way is wine more fine than water); but the fineness that comes with elemental water is that of simplicity, in the way that an element is simpler than a mixture.

119. To the third [n.93] I admit that it would be possible for a good or a bad angel to apply some active powers to a mixture as passive object, whereby elemental water might be resolved out of it. For I did not say that artificial water was not elemental water because art was involved in it (for art is present not as producing the term but as applying something active to something passive); but I say that no art can apply the same active force (such as fire) to passive mixtures, however diverse, such that there would be, by that active force, an immediate dissolution into elemental water; for that same agent cannot have a force, as a force, of changing things without going through intermediate forms, nor even of corrupting such diverse things back to the same term.

120. To the fourth [n.94[ the answer is plain from what was said about impurity through juxtaposition [nn.111-112].

121. As to the fifth [n.95], Innocent responds in the cited Decretals that the water which flowed from the Savior’s side was not bodily humor but true water.

122. He proves it from the words of the Gospel, John 19.35, “‘And he who saw it has borne witness to the truth.’ He would certainly not have said water if it had not been water but some bodily fluid.”

123. He proves it also a posteriori from the matter of baptism. “Nor,” he says, “would the true sacrament of regeneration have been thereby shown, since in the sacrament of baptism people are not regenerated with bodily fluid but with water.”

124. He proves it also from the water that has to be added in the sacrament of the Eucharist.

125. He proves it fourth “from what prefigured it in the Old Testament when Moses struck the flint, from which not bodily fluid but water flowed.”

126. In support of the proof he makes response in the same place, namely that “either the water there was miraculously created anew, or was distilled from components.”

127. But whatever may be said about the water from the side of Christ - because this flowed as it pleased him, not because the sacraments took their efficacy from it, as said above [d.2 nn.19, 32], but because of a certain more perfect likeness to baptism and the Eucharist [d.2 n.42]) - it is nevertheless certain that baptism can only be performed with usual water, because Christ instituted this [n.105].

Question Four. Whether the Institution of Baptism Voids Circumcision

128. Proceeding thus to the fourth principal question [d.2 nn.29, 32], argument is made that baptism does not void circumcision:

Because in Matthew 5.17 it is said, “I have not come to break the Law, but to fulfill it.” But circumcision was a precept in the Law, Genesis 17.10-11. Therefore Christ did not void it by instituting baptism. A confirmation is that Christ received circumcision in himself.

129. Again, in Genesis 17.13 circumcision was given to Abraham in an eternal pact. Therefore it was going to last always, otherwise it would not have been eternal.

130. Again, no inferior has authority to revoke a law instituted by a superior. But it is certain that God instituted the Mosaic Law and circumcision, but no place is found in the New Testament where he revoked it. Rather Christ kept the Law during the whole time of his mortal life, even before the cena by eating the paschal lamb. And the disciples did not have the authority to revoke it.     Therefore etc     .

131. On the contrary:

John 3.5, “Unless a man be born again     etc .;” therefore      baptism after its institution was simply necessary for salvation. Therefore circumcision was voided, because two remedies necessary and sufficient for the same thing are not concurrent at the same time.

132. Again, Galatians 5.2, “If you are circumcised, Christ is of no profit to you.”

I. Preamble to the Question: That Baptism was Instituted in the New Law is True and Reasonable

133. This question supposes that baptism was instituted in the New Law. And it is true and reasonable.

A. It is True

134. It is true, as is plain from many necessary authorities in the New Testament, of Christ and the Apostles, wherein the necessity of baptism is proved, which would not be the case if baptism had not been legitimately instituted in the [New] Law.

135. However there is doubt about when it was first instituted.

Not indeed when Christ was baptized by John, because that was not a baptism of Christ, that is, according to Christ’s form, but according to John’s form. Yet Christ did then dedicate water, from the contact with it of his most pure flesh, as suitable matter for his baptism, because the use of water was confirmed in the legislator, that is, as a ministry.

136. Nor too was baptism instituted in the words of John 3.5, when the Lord says to Nicodemus, “Unless a man be born again of water etc.,” because it is not likely that so necessary a sacrament was instituted in secret before a private person, who was not due to be a herald of that institution.

137. Nor too was it deferred to the time of the Ascension, Matthew 28.19 [“Go then and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit”], for the disciples were baptizing with the baptism of Christ before the Passion: in John 3.26 the disciples of John say to John, “Rabbi, he to whom you bore witness, behold he is baptizing and all come to him,” and in the following chapter, John 4.1, “Although Jesus did not baptize but his disciples.”

138. The time, then, of the institution is convincingly shown to have been before the time when Christ’s disciples were baptizing, although the hour is not precisely read in the Gospel.

B. It is Reasonable

139. This supposition also seems reasonable, because the principal sacrament of the New Law (namely, that through which entrance is made for its observance) needed to be new and proper to that Law, as was said before in d.1 nn.254-257.

140. This sacrament needed to be evident too in its signification, because this Law is the Law of truth that removes the shadow [cf. Hebrews 10.1].

141. It needed to be rich too in the conferring of grace, because this Law is the Law of grace, John 1.17, “Grace and truth were brought about through Jesus Christ.”

142. It needed to be easy too, because the yoke of Christ is pleasant and his burden light, Matthew 11.30.

143. It needed also to be common, because God chose for the Mosaic Law one people only, but for the New Law he chose the whole world, according to Psalm 18/19.4, “Their sound has gone out to all the earth.”

144. These five features [nn.139-143] are found in one thing, namely in the washing of baptism and its words, because it clearly signifies the cleansing of the soul, which is the principal effect, and copiously bestows grace. Hence in Psalm 22/23.2 it speaks of the waters of repose, “beside the waters of repose.” The washing of baptism is also easy, because it is in no way dangerous (as circumcision is), and is common to every sex and age.

II. Solution of the Question

145. On this supposition, then, that baptism is true and reasonable [nn.133-144], one needs to see first whether the receiving of baptism was simply necessary, and second whether by it circumcision was voided.

A. Whether the Receiving of Baptism was Simply Necessary

146. As to the first point [n.145] I say that the institution preceded the promulgation; for a law is not promulgated unless it is first determined by the legislator so as to be fixed (and this determination can be called institution), and also unless it be revealed to someone as to solemn herald (and that, if he [the legislator] wanted it to be promulgated through a herald).

147. About this institution I say two things:

First that, before this institution, it was not simply necessary to be baptized, which is plain from John 15.22, “If I had not come and not spoken to them, they would not have sin.” From this statement I take this proposition, that ‘no one is held to any divine precept unless it be promulgated through someone suitable and authorized, or comes from true report and the testimony of good men, which anyone rationally ought to believe’; and I understand this of positive law, which is not known interiorly in the heart. Therefore, by this institution alone, preceding promulgation, the people were not by necessity obligated to baptism, and this especially about the precept, because it was a positive precept only. Now the positive precept, about circumcision, that preceded it, did not at once have to be dismissed (from the fact that it was certain it had been instituted by God) unless there were certitude also that the second precept [sc. about baptism] had been given by God. And this certitude about the second precept could not have been had without an authoritative promulgation.

148. Second I say that the promulgation of this sacrament could have been set down as double: one by way of counsel, another by way of precept.

149. Now the fact that it was first promulgated by way of counsel was fitting for two reasons: First because the Law of the Gospel, which is most perfect, should not be hastily imposed, but men should be attracted to it first while it still fell under counsel, so that, after they were practiced in it, it might be imposed under precept. Second, because the Old Law was not bad the way idolatry is, and therefore should not be rejected suddenly (for then it would have been rejected as if something evil), but the Synagogue had to be buried with honor, so it might be shown to have been good for its time.

150. Now the imposition of baptism by way of precept [n.148] was a voiding of circumcision, at least as to the necessity of it. But promulgation by way of precept had at some point to follow, because otherwise this Law [of baptism] would never have fixity or necessity, at least as regards the sacrament.

151. And one should in general note that the promulgation made about divine counsel does oblige as to not despising it; for he who despises the counsel despises the one giving the counsel insofar as he gives counsel; and therefore he who does not wish to keep the divine evangelical counsel, as if despising it as irrational and fruitless, sins mortally. Hence let those who attack evangelical poverty see to it lest, if they do not wish to keep it (because it is not necessary), it happen that, by despising and belittling it, they despise Christ who urged to its observance as meritorious and useful for eternal life (as is contained in the sixth book of the Decretals 5 tit.12 ch.3, ‘On the Signification of Words’ [Nicholas III, 1279]).

But promulgation by way of precept obliges, not only to not despising it, but also to observing it if it is positive, or to guarding against it if it is negative.

152. Now I have said this about divine counsel and precept because it is otherwise with human ones, even when speaking of the counsel and precept of a superior or a prelate. For it is licit to despise both a precept and a counsel of some superior, that is, to judge it irrational and fruitless, but it is not licit, while he is a prelate, to despise it by not observing it, because it is said in Matthew 23.2-3, “For the Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat; therefore keep and do whatever they tell you, but do not do according to their works; for they say and do not do.”

153. The proof of this (about despising the precept or counsel of a superior) is that we are not necessarily bound to have a true opinion about one’s superior, but his advice or precept can be in itself irrational and fruitless; and then one must work rationally and usefully for its revocation, and for the correction and admonition of such a prelate, who is giving precepts fatuously. However, a subordinate is not bound to repudiate the prelate’s precept as a mortal sin, or to repudiate it as irrational and fruitless, but he can think the opposite about it, the way it is, and despise it by not approving of it.

154. It is thus plain, therefore, that the first obligation of baptism, the one by way of counsel, has obligated everyone not to despise it. But the second obligation, the one by way of precept, has obligated everyone to the reception of it to whom it has legitimately come.

B. Whether Circumcision was Voided by Baptism

1. Opinion of Others

a. Exposition of the Opinion

155. About the second main point [n.145], namely whether circumcision was voided by the fact that reception of baptism was simply necessary [n.154], the response is made that the time when baptism fell under counsel was from the first publication of it to the passion of Christ, and this did not void circumcision, not even as to its necessity. For during that time it was necessary for a Jew to circumcise his child, because that law was not yet revoked, as neither was the other imposed.

156. But from the time of the passion to the time of the publication of the Gospel, circumcision was licit but not necessary nor useful, because the obligations of the Law were fulfilled in the death of Christ. This is proved from the verse in John 19.30: when, with death imminent, Christ said, “It is finished.” And if it be asked what for a child of a Jew there was as remedy against original sin from Christ’s passion up to the publication of the Gospel, the response is that it was not circumcision but the faith of the parents, as in the time of the law of nature.

157. But in the third time, after the publication of the Gospel, circumcision was death dealing, and for this time Paul says Galatians 5.2, “If you are circumcised, Christ will profit you nothing.”

b. Rejection of the Opinion

158. Against the first of these [n.155] the argument is as follows: if a precept when imposed totally revokes something else, then counsel or admonishment about it makes that something else non-necessary. The reason is that where something whose act when prescribed is prohibition of the act of something else, there the counseling of its act is a license not to observe the act of that something else. Therefore, if precept about baptism was prohibition of circumcision (as to its fruit), then counsel about baptism rendered circumcision non-necessary.

159. There is a confirmation of this, that if some Jew before the Passion had, at the preaching of Christ or St. Peter, baptized his child and not circumcised him, then that child, had he died, would have been saved, because he received grace in baptism; for baptism conferred grace from its first institution.

160. But if you say that it is true baptism would have been sufficient for the child but the father would have sinned in not circumcising him - on the contrary: because he was able to circumcise his son before the eighth day, and from the fact he already had a remedy against original sin, and the father believed this (for he believed baptism to be efficacious for it), then it seems he was not necessarily bound to make provision from the other remedy for his child.

161. Against the second [n.156], which is asserted about the time between the passion of Christ and the promulgation of the Gospel, I argue as follows, that no one is differently disposed as to some law save because he has it differently promulgated to him; but after the passion of Christ, before the Apostles were preaching baptism, baptism was not promulgated to the people differently than it was before the passion; therefore no one was obligated to baptism after the passion differently than before, and so neither was he differently disposed as to circumcision

162. Again, the precepts get their power of obligating and of remedying and curing from the same source; the fact is plain from Bede in his Homily on John 3.5: “unless a man will have been born again” (and it is put in Lombard’s text, IV d.1 ch.10), “He who is now terribly and salubriously exclaiming, ‘Unless a man will have...’ (and ‘terribly’ is said by Bede because of the strictness of the obligation, and ‘salubriously’ because of the efficacy of the remedy), he was exclaiming before through the Law, Genesis 17.14, ‘A male child the flesh of whose foreskin is not circumcised, his soul will perish from the people.’” But circumcision retains its obligatory power until it be authentically revoked; therefore by the same fact it had the power of providing remedy until that revocation. But by Christ’s death alone it was not revoked differently than before, as is plain from the preceding reason [n.161], because no law was promulgated to anyone differently than before.

163. Again after the death of Christ until the time of promulgation the Jews were bound to circumcise their children, because they did not in any way have certainty about the revocation of circumcision. Now no one imposed circumcision on his child save as to its being useful and necessary for him for salvation, because he was bound to put hope in circumcision just as he did before; so ‘was he bound necessarily to have a false opinion about circumcision?’ - which amounts to saying nothing, because God deceives no one nor does he obligate anyone necessarily to deceive.

164. Again, man was never left without a remedy that was certain and a remedy about which he would not be certain that the remedy was certain; but the time after the passion before the publication [of baptism], there was no new certain remedy given to them, because neither was it promulgated to them; therefore, the remedy remained the same as before and was equally certain; therefore circumcision remained equally as before.

165. Against the third [n.157], which is asserted of the time after the publication of the Gospel, the passage in Acts 21.15-26 is plain, where it is read about Paul that he went up to Jerusalem, and there, on the advice of James and the other brothers (after the fourth synod held in JerusalemThe four synods, according to Bede Retraction concerning the Acts of Apostles 21.25, are first when Matthias was chosen to replace Judas among the Twelve (Acts 1), second when seven were chosen to be deacons (Acts 6), third about not imposing circumcision on the believing Gentiles (Acts 15), fourth about not preventing the believing Jews from performing the ceremonies of the Old Law (Acts 21). ¹⁹), he was purified according to the Law and went up to the temple and offered sacrifice for himself. And it is plain from Acts 21.20 how solemnly the Gospel had been published there, “See how many thousands of men in Judea have believed and all are zealous for the Law.” Therefore, while so great a publication of the Gospel is going on there, observance of the Law in Paul himself and among the converted Jews is approved of; and in the same place Paul himself among so many Christians accomplished a work of the Law.

166. Now the time when this purification and offering of Paul according to the Law will have been carried out can be conjectured partly from the way Acts proceeds, and partly from the Master of the Histories [Petrus Comestor, School History, chs.97-113]. For it was before the arrest of Paul seven days later, as is plain in Acts 21.27. Now this arrest was about the beginning of the reign of Nero, because Paul came to Rome in the third year of Nero, according to the Master of the Histories; and Nero began to reign about the twentieth year after the passion of Christ [54 AD, October 3, Tacitus Annals 12.69]. Now it seems that in so great a time the Gospel was sufficiently made public, and especially in Judea, where however Paul was observing the Law’s provisions.

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

a. About the Times of Baptism and Circumcision, and of their Interconnections

167. As concerns this article then [n.155], I say that in baptism there is need to distinguish two times only: a time when it was under counsel, and another when it was under precept.

168. The first time lasted from the beginning, from when the Gospel or baptism was preached by Christ or through the Apostles, up to the solemn and authentic preaching of the same after the ascension of Christ; such that the first time does not obtain, through Christ’s death or after it, any difference for the sole reason that the time ran differently afterwards than before.

169. Now the second time, as I believe, began on the day of Pentecost in Jerusalem, because up to that time the Apostles did not teach publicly, according to the word of Christ, “Now you remain in the city until you are clothed with power from on high” [Luke 24.49]. But on the day of Pentecost, after the Holy Spirit had been sent, the Apostles did preach publicly, “and on that day were added around three thousand souls” and were baptized (Acts 2.41), and from then on, as to other cities in order, the second time for each place or nation was when the Law of the Gospel was preached there publicly and solemnly - such that the second time did not begin at once for everyone whatever but “from Sion went forth the Law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem,” according to Isaiah 2.3. And for some the second time began a month after Pentecost, and for others a year, for others four years, in the way it was preached to them, and so on continually.

170. But as concerns circumcision I distinguish four times: for the first time it was necessary; for the second it was useful and not necessary; for the third neither useful nor necessary, though licit; for the fourth altogether illicit and death dealing.

171. The first time of circumcision preceded both times of baptism.

172. The second time of circumcision accompanied the first time of baptism for (as argued previously, nn.158-160), as soon as baptism was counseled, circumcision was not necessary for him who wanted to be baptized, but both then ran together under disjunction as either/or, so that a Jew might choose whichever of them; for it was licit and it profited him to be circumcised if he wanted (for circumcision was not then revoked as to utility or as to liceity); it was also licit for him, indeed it was laudable, to be baptized. And this is fitting enough, because in the intermediate time between the two Laws, when the first was not immediately taken away nor the second imposed, at that time, I say, they ran together under disjunction as either/or.

173. Now the third time of circumcision ran with the second time of baptism; and this ran, as concerns the Jews, up to the time of Paul’s purification, which was argued about before [nn.165-166]. Nay, it is likely that it ran well beyond that time, because at the time of Paul’s purification the brothers in Jerusalem seemed to be approving of the observance of the Law and to be consulting Paul about it [Acts. 21.20-25].

174. But as concerns the Gentile converts to the faith, the second time of baptism and the fourth of circumcision ran together, at least after fourteen years or thereabout from the passion of Christ [Galatians 2.1, Comestor History on Acts ch.77], namely when Paul went up to Jerusalem to the elders on the question about which is Acts 15, where first Peter alleges the case of Cornelius (on which is Acts 10), and then James “as bishop of Jerusalem gave his opinion” (according to Comestor, Master of the Histories), saying [15.19-20], “I judge that we trouble not at all those who are converted to God and that we write to them to abstain from pollutions of idols, and from fornication, and from things strangled, and from blood.”

175. Of these four things, two, namely to abstain from sacrifices to idols and from fornication, are necessary, and so they needed especially to be written about to them, because the Gentiles worried little about these things. The two others, namely abstaining from things strangled and from blood, were not necessary but they were well suited for the converted Gentiles to abstain from, lest those Gentile nations be abominable to the Jews (just as it well becomes man in society to abstain from certain things that are abominable to his fellows, though they are not simply illicit).

176. Therefore, the second time of baptism from its beginning altogether made circumcision illicit as far as concerns the converted Gentiles, or at least it did so after the time of the third council in Jerusalem [nn.165 fn.], just now touched on [n.174], about which the elders decreed, in the fourteenth or fifteenth year after the passion of Christ, that the Law should not be imposed on the converted Gentiles. But as concerns the converted Jews, the second time of baptism did neither from its beginning nor after the third council of the Apostles altogether exclude circumcision as illicit, or other provisions of the [Old] Law, but these were licitly observed for a long time afterwards.

b. About the Ways in which Peter and Paul conducted themselves in the Presence of Convert Jews and Gentiles

177. If you object that Paul resisted Peter in Antioch, as he writes to the Galatians 2.11-14, “When Cephas had come to Antioch I resisted him to his face, because he was to blame,” and he adds the cause, “For before certain people had come from James, Peter was eating with the Gentiles; but when they had come he withdrew and separated himself from them, in fear of those who were of the circumcision, and the rest of the Jews consented to his pretense.” And the rebuke follows in the same place, “If you, though you are a Jew, live as the Gentiles and not as a Jew, how do you compel the Gentiles to behave like Jews?” Now this was not long after the third council in Jerusalem, according to the Master of the Histories, because “in the fourth year of Claudius [45AD] Peter came to Rome,” and on the way to Rome, when he passed through Antioch, these things happened. But this was sufficiently quickly after the aforesaid council, which was in the fourteenth or fifteenth year after the passion of Christ.If Christ’s passion was 33AD then 14 or 15 years later would be 47 or 48AD, which does not fit Scotus’ earlier remark from Comestor about the year, 45AD, when Peter came to Rome after passing through Antioch. If Christ’s passion was 30AD then the date from Comestor of Peter’s arrival in Rome fits better. ²⁰

178. I reply that about this deed of Peter there seemed to be a controversy between two exceptional Apostles, Peter and Paul, and afterwards between two famous masters, Augustine and Jerome [Augustine epistle 82 to Jerome, Jerome epistle 112 to Augustine]. Saving the reverence of the others, I hold with Paul and Augustine. For although the Apostles could err in the acts or words that they said as men, yet no Apostle or Prophet in any way erred insofar as he was writer of any part of Scripture. Because, according to Augustine in his epistle 40 to Jerome (and it is in Gratian Decretum p.1 d.9 ch.7), “If there were to be any lie admixed in the divine Scriptures, however small or useful, nothing remains in them of solid truth whereby an adversary may be convinced; for whatever were alleged against him, he will reply that it was falsely said, humorously or usefully, as the other remark is which is conceded to have been falsely said.” Hence Augustine says, “For only to these books, which are called ‘canonical’, have I learnt to give this reverence, that I should believe most firmly that none of them erred in the writing.”

179. Since therefore Paul in his letter to the Galatians, which is part of canonical Scripture, writes this, “I resisted him, because he was to blame,” and he adds, “But when I saw that he was not walking rightly as regard the truth of the Gospel” - it is necessary to say that these words are simply true, or the authority of the whole Scripture is taken away.

180. One must ask, therefore, what the sense is of these words so as to make them true:

For it cannot be said that Peter was then to blame because he was then keeping the Law, for Paul too after that event circumcised Timothy [Acts. 16.3]. For the deed [of Peter] took place shortly after the third council, while Barnabas was still present with Paul in Antioch after their return from Jerusalem (as the Master of the Histories says), namely when Peter, heading toward Rome, passed through Antioch [n.177]. Now Paul circumcised Timothy after his separation from Barnabas, namely when, after taking Silas, he proceeded to visit the brothers whom he had before preached to, as is plain in Acts 16.

Also, a good ten years after that time Paul was purified according to the Law, and the whole converted multitude in Judea was observing the Law, Acts 21.

Nor does it seem that Peter was to blame because he was observing the Law in this way, namely in separating his food, because this too was not more death dealing than other provisions of the Law, namely purification and the like.

181. Either, then, Peter will be said to have been to blame because he was observing the Law in that act, by removing himself from the Gentiles in food and drink -and that this was not to be done seems to have been said to him before by God, Acts 10.13-15 about Cornelius. Or Peter will be said to have been to blame because, while not observant of the Law previously in this regard before the Gentiles, he was observant of it in this regard afterwards, when the Jews came up [to Antioch].

182. And both of these answers could be posited in several ways.

For the first [n.181] could be said to be blameworthy:

Because “to whatever Church you come, conform yourself to it,” Ambrose says to Augustine [Augustine, To the Queries of Januarius I ch.2 n.3; Gratian Decretum p.1 d.12 ch.11]; therefore, in the Church of the Gentiles it was blameworthy not to conform oneself to their manner of living.

183. Or because in this Peter was giving occasion to the Gentiles for observing the Law, either showing in deed as it were that this was necessary, or at least necessary for this purpose, so that converts from among the Jews would want to communicate with the Gentiles (and inferiors often would cause some difficulties so as not be excluded from communion with superiors).

184. And to this understanding [nn.182-183] Paul’s rebuke in Galatians 2.11-14 [n.179] could be referred, “You are compelling the Gentiles to Judaize,” either by showing them with example that it would be simply necessary for them to keep the Law, or by showing them that it would be necessary for them in order to be worthy of communion with the faithful Jews, or that, by imitating the examples of the ancestors, it would be at least more praiseworthy for them than would be the opposite.

185. The second too [n.181] can be understood:

Either because Peter was engaging in pretense, not reckoning in his heart that this was to be done, namely what he did in his body; for from the first deed that he did, in the absence of the messengers from James, it appeared that he did not feel that one should keep apart from Gentile converts to the faith; and in the second deed he showed that one should do so. And to this understanding can be referred the statement of Paul that “the others consented to his pretense,” Galatians 2.13.

186. Or the second answer [nn.181, 185] could be said to be blameworthy because Peter did not use a prelate’s authority; for since he was superior to the messengers from James, he should rather himself hold firmly in deed to the truth and lead them to his own rightness than to be turned, because of fear of them, to that which was pleasing or more acceptable to them; and such yielding or timidity of a prelate is for a time blameworthy.

187. And to this understanding [nn.185-186] can be referred what Paul says, “[Peter] separated himself from them, fearing those of the circumcision” [Galatians 2.12]. For there was really no fear there, because it was simply licit for Jews not to keep the Law, and especially when they were among Gentiles; and this Peter ought to have shown by his example to the messengers as to his inferiors.

188. About each of these four [deeds, nn.182-183, 185-186] there could be discussion as to how and how much it was blameworthy; and provided the words of Paul in Scripture could be saved [Galatians 3.1-29], it is better to say that, whichever of them was there the case, it was venial rather than mortal.

189. And the sin cannot be excused because Peter did this to avoid scandal to the Jews, since there would not be matter of scandal there, whether for the perfect or for children, but only for Pharisees; and one should not care about that scandal, as Christ teaches in Matthew 15.12-14, to whom when the disciples had said, “You know that when they heard this word the Pharisees were scandalized,” namely eating without washing of hands, he replied, “for what enters into the mouth does not defile a man;” Caring not about the scandal, he said “let them alone, they are blind, leaders of the blind.” Now such would have been the scandal here, because no one should be scandalized because of the kind of act, unless he is thinking badly of Gospel freedom.

190. Nor can Paul for such reason (about avoiding scandal) be excused in circumcising Timothy, or in purifying himself [n.180], because nothing illicit is to be done for the sake of avoiding any scandal whatever. Hence Gregory IX Decretals V tit. 41 ch.3, about the rules of right, ‘He who is scandalized’, says, “More usefully is a scandal permitted than a truth given up.” At least this is true for truth of life always and at all times in the case of negative precepts, and in the case of affirmative precepts for the time when they are to be fulfilled.

191. Briefly, then, Paul among the Jews licitly kept the precepts of the Law, even a long time after the third council; and this was licit provided however he himself put no hope in them, although it was not useful or necessary. But among the Gentiles he conformed himself to the Gentiles, because it was licit for him not to keep [the precepts of the Law] during the second time of baptism.

192. And Peter in Jerusalem did not sin in keeping the Law, because it was licit then also for a Jew to keep the Law among Jews. Now in Antioch, among Gentile converts, he did not sin in not keeping the Law; but in conforming himself to them in food and drink he did not sin; for it was possible for him not to keep the Law. But he did sin afterwards in separating himself from them in food and drink - because of one of the four reasons previously stated [nn.182-187], so as to keep and save the words of Paul [n.188].

c. About the Definitive Revocation of Circumcision

193. And if you ask when circumcision was simply illicit even for convert Jews, I reply that we do not have that time in canonical Scripture, because Scripture’s history does not take the Church beyond the fifth year of Nero [59AD], namely not beyond the thirtieth year from the passion of Christ; and in all that time too the convert Jews were observing the Law, because it was licit for them.

194. Nor do I believe that up to the overthrow of Jerusalem was observance omitted, or up to the dispersion of the Jews, with convert Gentiles among Jews; for then they began perhaps to conform themselves to the Gentiles among whom they were dispersed; and in this way observance little by little ceased even among them.

195. Or it can be said in another way that, through the Apostles or their successors at a determinate time, God simply prohibited the precepts of the Law from being kept, although we do not have anything in Scripture about this because Scripture’s history does not last up to that time. But it is probable, because the Church now holds it a heresy to say that the legal precepts are current with Gospel Law, as is contained in Gregory IX Decretals III tit.42 ch.3, ‘About baptism and its effect,’ where Innocent III says, “Far be it that we should fall into that damned heresy, which wrongly affirms that the Law is to be kept along with the Gospel, and circumcision along with baptism.”

196. Now it does not seem that the Church would judge this a heresy from the mere omission of it by Jews not keeping the Law (through some necessity of dispersion or the like), but it seems that this was because of some revocation simply done by God.

3. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

197. To the arguments made for the preceding opinion:

To the first [n.155], when it is said that circumcision was not revoked before the death of Christ, I say that it is true: not revoked so as to be useless (as if useless and illicit), but revoked, that is relaxed, so as no longer to be necessary, because counsel about another remedy [baptism] relaxed the precept about the prior one [circumcision]; for from the fact that the second was a remedy simply and was being counselled, it was licit - nay it was laudably licit - not to use the prior remedy against the same.

198. To the argument about John 19.30, “it is consummated” [n.156], I say that this is understood of the things that were written about the Son of man, according to Luke 18.31, “Behold we go up to Jerusalem and all things will be consummated that are written about the Son of man through the prophets.” Or if this be referred to the Old Law, the consummating must be understood thus, ‘it is consummated in its cause’, because the death of Christ was the cause of the confirmation or the consummation of the Law of the Gospel. But that Law was not consummated or confirmed as necessary for observance before the public preaching of it, which did not begin at the passion but on the day of Pentecost. For in the time between the disciples sat in the upper room [Acts 2.2], preaching to no one solemnly and publicly, or not yet

III. To the Initial Arguments

199. To the initial arguments.

To the first [n.128] I say that in the Law there were legal, judicial, and ceremonial precepts, and as to each of them can be understood Christ’s word, Matthew 5.17, “I have not come to destroy the Law etc.”

200. For the decalogue remains simply but it is more perfectly expounded than the Jews understand it, as is plain in Matthew 5.21-22, 27-28, “You have heard that it was said to them of old time, ‘Thou shalt not kill’, but I say to you whoever says to his brother ‘raca’ will be in danger of the council. But whoever says ‘You fool’ shall be in danger of hell fire.” And “‘Thou shalt not commit adultery’, but I say to you whoever looks upon a woman to lust after her has committed adultery with her in his heart.”

201. Now the judicial precepts do not remain in themselves, but in their equivalents as to their end; and the end of the judicial precepts was the peaceful living together of men. But the morals of the Gospel avail more for peaceful sharing together than the law of ‘an eye for an eye’ [Exodus 21.24-25, Deuteronomy 19.21, Matthew 5.38]; for peace is more preserved if you do not strike him who strikes you than if an eye is given for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Hence in brief, no judicial precept of that Law is now binding, just as not of this law: for it is licit well enough now for princes to establish some of the things that were in the Law of Moses, and they bind now by the authority of the prince now establishing them, not by the authority of the Old Law (just as it is licit for one king to establish a law in his kingdom that exists in another kingdom, but it is there binding not because it is the law of the other kingdom, but because it has been instituted here by this king).

202. And the ceremonial precepts do not remain in themselves but in what they signified, because the shadow has passed away and the truth has succeeded [cf. Hebrews 10.1ff.]; for all the [ceremonial] purifications were signifying purification from sin, and the oblations were signifying the perfect oblation of Christ and certain acts of worship (of faith, of hope, and of love for God), and these are completed in the host now offered, and through it in purged sins and minds directed to the worship of God. I say therefore that Christ did not come to destroy the Law or circumcision as to the fruit for which I was instituted; rather he perfected it more copiously in destroying it and by instituting a far more perfect remedy (as was said in making clear the supposition of this question [nn.139-144]).

203. To the confirmation, when it says ‘Christ in himself was circumcised’ [n.128], I reply that it is not necessary for a legislator to take away his law at once, before necessity; and therefore the prior law still endures at the beginning of Christ’s time. Hence too the things that belonged to the law of nature were to be observed around Moses up until the time of the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai. So here. And in the same way can it be said of the eating of the Paschal Lamb in the Last Supper, because in the death of Christ causally the Old Law died, though not for that time then but for the time of publication of this cause and [New] Law; and so Christ could up to his death licitly observe those ceremonial precepts.

204. To the second argument [n.129] ‘eternal pact’ can be given the exposition ‘in itself or in its equivalent’, or perhaps, more to the meaning of the letter, that there was an eternal pact between God and Abraham and his seed specifically; because there was never another sign specifically between God and that race, and yet there was future another sign of a pact between God and the whole human race, and it was better for the ‘seed of Abraham’ to pass over into that common pact than to remain under the sign of a specific pact, for it was better for the part to be in a whole for which it might be simply good than for it to be distinct from the remaining parts so as to be in some way good for itself but bad for others.

205. To the third [n.130] it is plain that, as to the convert Gentiles, the precept about circumcision was revoked in the third council by the authority of Peter and James, rather of the Holy Spirit, because James says, “It has seemed good to us and to the Holy Spirit” [Acts 15.28]. But as to the Jews the supposition is that it was at some time revoked, though the time of revocation has simply not been explicated in Scripture.